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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The majority opinion was based on the premise that the
right of sequestration included a right to have defense witnesses
free from police interrogation which might influence or at least
color their later testimony. In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Sanders relied on the oft-quoted statement that:
"The objective of witness-sequestration is to prevent wit-
nesses from being influenced by the testimony of other
witnesses and to strengthen the roll [sic] of cross-examina-
tion in exposing false testimony. The primary purpose of
the instruction limiting discussion of the case to the district
attorney and defense counsel is to prohibit the witnesses
from discussing the case with each other other. '29
The broad majority construction of the purpose and scope
of the witness sequestration may pose future problems. What
about interrogation of a sequestered witness by an investigator
in the district attorney's office? Can the effects of oppressive
and intimidating police interrogation of a key witness be cured
by ordering a mistrial? Such impermissible official action might
mean, as Justice Sanders infers, that irreparable damage has
been done which will preclude any fair trial, and thus be a
bar to a retrial of the case. The facts stated in Willis do not
show any coercive questioning by the police, and so it would
appear that defendant's rights were properly safeguarded by
the procedure followed by the trial judge. In any event, the
purpose and scope of the sequestration order may have been
given a new and somewhat unexpected dimension by the Wills
decision. In any event, the decision is not authority for a denial
of the district attorney's right to properly interrogate, through
his staff or investigators, sequestered witnesses.
EVIDENCE
George W. Pugh*
RELEVANcY
Past Acts of Misconduct
The admissibility of other criminal acts, a matter which
recently has so much plagued and divided the court, was again
29. 260 La. at 712, 257 So.2d at 379.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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the subject of several opinions.' The principles are fairly clearly
established; the disagreement comes in the application of the
principles.
Reference to other crimes of the defendant may be very
prejudicial to the rights of a defendant. Although relevant to
show that a defendant is a "bad man" and thus more likely to
commit crimes than good men, evidence of past crimes is inad-
missible for this purpose; a defendant's character is not at issue
unless he places it at issue,2 and even when in issue, is not to be
proved by specific instances.8 Nonetheless where a past act of
misconduct has an independent relevance, as, for example, to
show knowledge, intent, plan, scheme, identity, etc., evidence of
a past crime under appropriate circumstances may properly be
admitted.4
In eloquent dissenting opinions, Justices Tate and Barham
forcefully and persuasively argued in State v. Hills5 that the
majority had misapplied the governing principles, considerably
overextending the exception.6 The writer agrees with the dis-
senters that under the circumstances the evidence in question
should have been excluded as not sufficiently similar or other-
wise connected to the instant crime to fit under the knowledge-
intent-plan exception.
1. See State v. Whitsell, 262 La. 165, 262 So.2d 509 (1972); State v. Isaac,
261 La. 487, 260 So.2d 302 (1972); State v. Nelson 261 La. 153, 259 So.2d 46
(1972); State v. Carney, 260 La. 995, 257 So.2d 687 (1972); State v. Modelist,
260 La. 945, 257 So.2d 669 (1972); State v. Dimopoullos, 260 La. 874, 257 So.2d
644 (1972); State v. Morris, 259 La. 1001, 254 So.2d 444 (1971); State v. Smith,
259 La. 515, 250 So.2d 724 (1971). Bee also State v. Smith, 262 La. 39, 262 So.2d
362 (1972) (a case dealing with cross-examination of defendant as to convic-
tion of prior crimes for purpose of showing knowledge, intent and system);
State v. Gray, 262 La. 53, 262 So.2d 367 (1972) (wherein the court reversed be-
cause of the admission of testimony on rebuttal of an unrelated crime, which
one of the dissenting justices felt was admissible to provide evidence of sur-
rounding circumstances of an inculpatory statement introduced by the State
in its case in chief and denied by the defendant when he later took the
stand); State v. Dotson, 260 La. 471, 256 So.2d 594 (1971) (where a divided
court on rehearing in a prosecution for possession of narcotics held evidence
was admissible on rebuttal as tending to show defendant had previously
smoked marijuana, to show guilty knowledge).
For discussion of cross-examination of a defendant who takes the stand
about his prior acts of misconduct see note S supra and accompanying text.
2. LA. CODE CRiM. P. art. 481.
3. LA. CODE CRiM. P. art. 491.
4. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 446. Even here, however, the value of
such evidence may at times be outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice
(see Uniform Rule of Evidence 21) and in such cases, it is submitted, the
trial court, in its sound discretion, should exclude the evidence.
5. 259 La. 436, 250 So.2d 394 (1971).
6. Justice Dixon also dissented, but did not assign written reasons.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
In another case, State v. GarrisonJ to rebut testimony given
on the stand by the defendant indicating that he and a state's
witness were on friendly terms, the prosecution was permitted
to recall the witness and elicit from him that the witness had
feared that the defendant and his companion wanted to rob him.
The supreme court upheld the conviction holding that the testi-
mony was not evidence of another unrelated criminal act and
was proper rebuttal. It seems to this writer, however, that the
trial court erred, that the testimony in question was unsubstan-
tiated suspicion that the defendant intended to commit another
criminal act. It was highly prejudicial in character, and what-
ever relevancy it had seems to have been overborne by its prej-
udicial impact.
WITNESSEs-ATTAcIaNG CREDIBILITY
Cross-examination As To Past Acts of Misconduct
A defendant may be severely prejudiced if when he takes the
stand he is questioned about other unrelated crimes. Louisiana
law makes clear that any witness s (including the defendant) 9
may be cross-examined about prior criminal convictions for pur-
poses of impeachment. This rule may be undesirable,'* for it
strongly discourages a defendant with a record of criminal con-
victions from taking the stand since there is a heavy risk that a
jury might resolve doubts against a person with a "record." It is
clear, however, in the impeachment area, that the prosecution is
not to go into details of the crime underlying the conviction,,1
and this affords some protection to the defendant who takes the
stand. Ostensibly the criminal conviction used for purposes of
impeachment is just that; it is properly to be used by the jury
only in weighing the testimony of the defendant, not to establish
his guilt of the crime charged. Its practical effect, however, may
be much more, for the jury may disregard the limiting instruc-
tion.12
Convictions used for purposes of impeachment are to be
sharply distinguished from crimes used by the state in its case
7. 260 La. 141, 255 So.2d 719 (1971).
8. L. . CoDE CRIM. P. art. 495.
9. LA. CODE C Im. P. art. 462.
10. See the position taken in Uniform Rule of Evidence 21.
11. See State v. Perkins, 248 La. 293, 178 So.2d 255 (1965); State v. Danna,
170 La. 755, 129 So. 154 (1930).
12. See In this regard such cases as Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964)
and Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
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in chief when admissible as evidence of the crime charged, as,
for example, to show knowledge, intent, plan, scheme and iden-
tity.18
Unless testimony as to some other act of misconduct on the
part of a defendant in a criminal case is admissible under the
knowledge-intent-plan exception to the exclusionary rule rela-
tive to prior criminal acts, or admissible as an admission by con-
duct 14 and therefore testimony as to it was admissible in the
state's case in chief, a defendant on the stand should normally
not be subject to cross-examination about a past criminal act
except where he was convicted for the crime and the conviction
would hence be admissible for purposes of impeachment.15 The
mere fact that prior criminal acts tend to show a defendant wit-
ness to be a "bad man" and hence more likely to lie than a good
man, should not suffice to permit the state on cross-examination
to bring in by the heels a past act of misconduct for which there
has been no conviction, and thus egregiously prejudice the defen-
dant in the eyes of the jury.
State v. Morris' seems to this writer to run counter to the
above principles. As a result of what is believed to be an errone-
ous interpretation of article 450 of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure17 relative to the admission of a confession in its entirety, 8
the prosecution in its case in chief was permitted to introduce
testimony that the defendant had admitted committing an extra-
neous unrelated robbery. It also adduced evidence that a pawn
ticket found in defendant's possession at the time of his arrest
13. For a discussion of the exclusionary rule as to prior criminal acts
and the knowledge-intent-plan exception, see note 1 supra and accompany-
ing text.
14. E.g., where the defendant or his agent attempted to bribe one of the
witnesses in the instant proceeding.
15. See State v. Kelly, 262 La. 143, 262 So.2d 501 (1972) (majority and
dissenting opinions); State v. Gray, 262 La. 53, 262 So.2d 367 (1972); and
State v. Perkins, 248 La. 293, 178 So.2d 255 (1965). A student comment on dis-
cussion of cross-examination of unrelated past acts of misconduct for pur-
pose of impeachment is scheduled to appear in a subsequent issue of this
Review.
A somewhat different problem is presented when one is dealing with a
witness other than the criminal defendant himself. For a case decided dur-
ing the past term holding that the trial court under appropriate circum-
stances may in its discretion limit a defendant's right to cross-examine a
state's witness as to an extraneous crime, see State v. Davis, 259 La. 35,
249 So.2d 193 (1971).
16. 261 La. 1069, 262 So.2d 324 (1972).
17. LA. CoDE Ctim. P. art. 450.
18. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate COurts for the 1967-1968
Term-Evidence, 29 LA. L. RzV. 310, 320 (1969).
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represented a wristwatch taken in the other robbery. Over objec-
tion, the trial court permitted the state to cross-examine the
defendant concerning the pawn ticket and the other robbery. The
supreme court, in a per curiam decision, took the position that
the "questioning was within the permissible scope of cross-
examination," and that it "was not error for the state to attempt
to impeach the defendant regarding the circumstances surround-
ing the pawn ticket."'-9 With deference, the writer disagrees, feel-
ing that much too wide a latitude was afforded the state in its
cross-examination of the defendant. Apparently no contention
was made that the other robbery was admissible to show knowl-
edge, intent, plan, scheme, etc.; it had come in solely on the
theory that it had been referred to in the confession, and that a
confession must be introduced in its entirety. The evidence of
the other crime was therefore apparently not properly evidence
of this crime; it came in merely because it was somehow men-
tioned in defendant's confession of the instant crime. This being
the case, it is submitted, defendant should not have been cross-
examined concerning the other crime; it was not, it is believed, a
proper basis for questioning for purpose of attacking credibility.
It is submitted that the per curiam in the Morris case should
not be interpreted as standing on any broad position that ques-
tioning for purpose of cross-examination of a defendant as to
other extraneous crimes is admissible for purposes of attacking
credibility--only that under the peculiar circumstances of the
instant case (where evidence of the unrelated extraneous crime
had come in because it was part of the confession) is such cross-
examination of the defendant permissible. Otherwise, the Morris
case would seem to be too much at variance with the views
expressed in the recent cases of State v. Kelly20 and State v.
Gray.2'
Cross-examination of Prosecutrix
The court held in State v. Smith 2 that it was improper cross-
examination of a prosecutrix in a rape case to bring out facts
showing that she had been pregnant with an illegitimate child
at the time of the alleged rape. Defendant urged that this was
19. 261 La. 1069, 1073, 262 So.2d 324, 325 (1972).
20. 262 La. 143, 262 So.2d 501 (1972) (majority and dissenting opinions).
21. 262 La. 53, 262 So.2d 367 (1972).
22. 259 La. 515, 250 So.2d 724 (1971).
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relevant and admissible to attack the credibility of the witness,
but the supreme court held it was irrelevant and inadmissible
absent a claim by the defense that the witness had consented to
intercourse.
Prior Inconsistent Statement-Effect
Traditionally Louisiana has followed the orthodox rule that
where a prior inconsistent statement of a non-party witness is
introduced in evidence, it is to be given impeaching value only,
i.e., it is to be used to tear down the testimony given by the wit-
ness on the stand, not as substantive evidence. Thus used, the
admissibility of the prior inconsistent statement does not impinge
upon the hearsay rule, for the out-of-court unsworn statement
comes in merely as a fact to neutralize the testimony of the
witness given on the stand. There is a movement which would
alter this approach and authorize substantive weight to be given
to the out-of-court utterance.2 In light of this movement, the
Louisiana supreme court, in a very well reasoned opinion au-
thored by Justice Sanders,24 reconsidered, and reaffirmed, "at
least for the present, '25 Louisiana's orthodox position. The writer
wholeheartedly agrees with the position thus taken in State v.
Ray. If substantive weight were to be given to an out-of-court
unsworn utterance, there is danger that a defendant may be sent
to the penitentiary on the basis of unsworn statements. In a
typical case in this area, a person who has given a favorable
statement to the prosecution-for example, a prosecutrix in a
statutory rape case--"turns sour" on the stand and denies that
defendant had intercourse with her. Assuming that the state is
permitted to impeach its witness, should the prior inconsistent
statement given to the police affirming the intercourse be given
substantive weight? Although it is true that the witness on the
stand is now under oath, the out-of-court statement was not
under oath nor subject to cross-examination at the time made.
Although now the defendant has the opportunity to cross-
examine, his interest is not in destroying the credibility of the
witness' present testimony, but in upholding it, for the witness
is now swearing that the defendant did not have intercourse with
her. In such situations, to give the out-of-court testimony sub-
23. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDEINCP § 251 (2d ed. 1972).
24. State v. Ray, 259 La. 105, 249 So.2d 540 (1971).
25. Id. at 113, 249 So.2d at 543.
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stantive weight would, in the opinion of the writer, be very unde-
sirable.26 The statement's verity is questionable, it has never
been affirmed under oath, and neither at the time made nor now
has it been the subject of effective cross-examination. The writer
concedes that many would argue for the abandonment of the
orthodox position, but it is gratifying that the Louisiana supreme
court has adhered to traditional safeguards in this area.
Prior Inconsistent Statement-Necessity of Limiting Instruction
For a number of years the Louisiana supreme court has taken
the position that when the state offers a prior inconsistent state-
ment to impeach a non-party witness, and the subject matter of
the statement bears upon the guilt or innocence of the defendant,
the trial court, on its own motion, is required contemporaneously
to instruct the jury that the statement is not to be given sub-
stantive weight, but to be used only to negative the testimony
given by the witness on the stand. 27 In State v. Ray,28 the rule
was reconsidered and found to be "a trap for the unwary judge
to the prejudice of the fair and efficient administration of jus-
tice. '29 The writer fully agrees. The court therefore gave notice
that as to cases tried in the future it would no longer adhere to
the old rule; if the defendant wants such a contemporaneous
instruction he must request it from the court. In order not "to
change the rules in the middle of the game, 'm however, the court
gave the defendant in the instant case the benefit of the old rule.
IDENTIFICATION
In State v. Morris,5 ' the supreme court upheld the trial
court's denial of defendant's motions, made in anticipation of
attempted in-court identification, that defendant be permitted to
sit outside the rail with the spectators, or in lieu thereof, that
several other blacks of the same general description as the defen-
dant sit at defense counsel's table with him. The supreme court
26. It should be noted, however, that in Caltfornia v. Green, 399 U.S. 149
(1970), it was held that it is not a violation of the fourteenth amendment
for a state to adopt a rule giving substantive weight to a witness' prior
inconsistent statement.
27. State v. Barbar, 250 La. 509, 197 So.2d 69 (1967) and State v. Reed,
49 La. Ann. 704, 21 So. 732 (1897). For a discussion of the weight to be given
to the prior inconsistent statement see note 23 supra and accompanying text.
28. 259 La. 105, 249 So.2d 540 (1971).
29. Id. at 113, 249 So.2d at 543.
80. Id. at 133, 249 So.2d at 550.
81. 259 La. 1001, 254 So.2d 444 (1971), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct. 2066 (1972).
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took the position that such matters are largely within the discre-
tion of the trial court, but generally reflected a negative attitude
toward such motions. The writer is much concerned about the
problem confronted by defendant, and feels that a defendant
should be permitted better means than those generally employed
to test the usual in-court eye-witness identification-especially
where, as in this case, the defendant is a black man sitting next
to his white lawyer at defense counsel's table.
PRIVILEGE
Informer Privilege
Although there is no express statutory authority for it, Lou-
isiana has recognized an informer privilege,82 and in the opinion
of this writer, properly so. Under certain circumstances the pub-
lic's interest in protecting police sources of information over-
balances the individual's interest in ascertaining the name of the
person who provided the police with the information. This is
often the case with respect to an informant who allegedly pro-
vided probable cause for a search and seizure, or information as
to where a defendant might be found and arrested.8 8 The ques-
tion is one of balancing competing interests. Where the identity
of the informer is sought by the defendant as a means of estab-
lishing his innocence of the crime, as, for example, where the
informer supposedly was an eye witness to the alleged crime,
then the balancing naturally favors disclosure.M
In State v. Dotson,8 5 a moving vehicle had been stopped by
police officers on the basis of information provided one of the
officers by an unnamed informant whom the officer claimed was
"reliable." Further, on the basis of information provided by the
informant, defendant was arrested for possession of narcotics.
32. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate courts for the 1969-1970
Term-Evidence, 31 LA. L. REV. 381, 384 (1971).
83. See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
34. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957); State v. O'Brien, 255
La. 704, 712, 232 So.2d 484, 487 (1970) (quoting from Scher v. United States,
305 U.S. 251 (1938): "[Plublic policy forbids disclosure of an informer's iden-
tity unless essential to the defense .... ), discussed in The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term-Evidence, 31 LA. L. Rev.
381, 884 (1971); State v. Pagnotta, 253 La. 770, 220 So.2d 69 (1969) (quoting
from the trial judge's per curiam: "There was to [no] allegation here by
the defendant through his counsel or through any testimony that the confi-
dential informant had framed him or had planted the evidence in his apart-
ment, or had done any other act which would require revealing his iden-
tity.") Id. at 779, 220 So.2d at 72.
35. 260 La. 471, 256 So.2d 594 (1971).
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Later, on searching the defendant, the police found a matchbox
containing marijuana and several small tablets. Defendant's
entire defense was that he had been "framed," that he had never
seen the matchbox, and that somehow it had been placed in his
pocket by either the unnamed informant or the police officers.
At the trial he demanded the name of the informer, but this vital
information was denied him. On original hearing, relying on lan-
guage in a prior Louisiana case3 6 and Roviaro v. United States,8T
and stressing that the information was vital to defendant's
defense on the merits, a majority of the Louisiana supreme court
(three justices dissenting) held that the denial was reversible
error.M The decision apparently caused considerable consterna-
tion among the state's district attorneys, for a brief amicus curiae
in which district attorneys throughout the state joined, sup-
ported the state's application for rehearing on this point. On
rehearing, with three justices dissenting, the court reversed itself
and upheld the conviction, taking the position that the authorities
cited by the majority on original hearing did not compel rever-
sal, and that whether or not the informant's name had to be
revealed under the circumstances was a matter for the sound
discretion of the trial court. In the opinion of the writer the
state should have been forced to reveal the name of the informer
or to dismiss the case; otherwise, under the facts given, it is
believed, defendant was denied a most fundamental constitu-
tional protection, his right to compulsory process.89 Possession
of narcotics is an offense which lends itself readily to the possi-
bility of a frame-up. Defendant claims this is what happened.
By denying defendant access to the informer, he was cut off
from securing information from one of the two people who, under
his theory of the case, could establish his innocence. Perhaps
defendant was not in good faith in asserting the frame-up
defense, but then again perhaps he was. The informant was the
key, and the state should have been forced either to provide the
information sought or to dismiss the prosecution. A defendant
is entitled to his day in court and, in the opinion of this writer,
here the name of the informant was necessary if defendant's day
in court was to afford him a meaningful test of the state's case.
86. State v. Pagnotta, 253 La. 770, 220 So.2d 69 (1969).
37. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
38. It also found that there was merit in three other bills of exceptions.
39. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
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Government Privilege
In State v. Andrews,O an auto theft prosecution, defense
counsel called two agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
to the stand. To questioning by the defense, the agents asserted
governmental privilege relying on departmental regulations.
Without inquiring as to the facts and circumstances underlying
the claimer of privilege, the trial judge stated he would not
order the testimony. The Louisiana supreme court, two justices
dissenting, affirmed, despite the fact that in the instant case the
United States Attorney General apparently had given no per-
sonal consideration to the circumstances of the case, nor had he
made a personal claimer of the privilege, as contemplated by
United States v. Reynolds.41 There had been no showing that
the answers to the questions would have in any way worked
prejudice to the government of the United States or its alleged
secrets. Although the Louisiana supreme court cited and quoted
at length from the Reynolds case, recognizing it as controlling
authority, in the opinion of this writer, the test laid down by
Reynolds and quoted by the court does not appear to have been
met.42 Recognition of the privilege under the circumstances may
well have constituted a violation of defendant's federal constitu-
tional right to compulsory process.48
HEARSAY
Prior Lineup Identification
There is language in State v. Wilkerson44 suggesting that
testimony by a witness as to another's out-of-court lineup identi-
40. 259 La. 339, 250 So.2d 359 (1971).
41. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
42. "The privilege belongs to the Government and must be asserted by
it; it can neither be claimed nor waived by a private party. It is not to be
lightly invoked. There must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the
head of the department which has control over the matter, after actual per-
sonal consideration by that officer....
"The court itself must determine whether the circumstances are appro-
priate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a disclosure
of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.
"There are differences in phraseology, but in substance it is agreed that
the court must be satisfied from all the evidence and circumstances, and
'from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked,
that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot
be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.'
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951). If the court is so
satisfied, the claim of the privilege will be accepted without requiring further
disclosure." 345 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1953). (Citations omitted.)
43. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
44. 261 La. 342, 259 So.2d 871 (1972).
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fication of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime is not
hearsay. If the relevancy of the testimony was to show that the
defendant committed the crime by showing that a third party
identified him as the culprit, then it certainly appears that the
testimony was of a hearsay character. Whether the third person
said that the defendant did it, or pointed to him as the man who
did it, is not determinative as to whether or not the statement is
to be classified as hearsay. It is the affirmation of the third party
that the defendant committed the crime which should be under
oath and tested by cross-examination; the person who saw or
heard the affirmation is merely a conduit.45
Res Gestae
Whether or not testimony is properly admissible under the
so-called "res gestae" exception to the hearsay rule is often a
difficult problem. The broad category "res gestae" should, it is
believed, be broken down into several separate exceptions and
analyzed accordingly." In this area, admissibility often depends
upon an analysis of the particular facts in a particular case, and
broad generalizations as to admissibility taken out of context
may rise to haunt the court in future cases.47 It is especially diffi-
cult, therefore, for the court adequately to communicate the basis
for admissibility in abbreviated per curiam decisions. Such, it is
believed, was the situation in State v. Madison,48 an aggravated
rape case. Without setting forth the facts, the court, in a per
curiam opinion, held that "[testimony by one of the arresting
officers regarding statements made to him by a witness at the
scene of the crime was properly admitted under the res gestae
exception to the hearsay rule" and in addition, "[s]tatements
made to the arresting officer by the complaining witness in the
presence of the defendant, and immediately after the commis-
sion of the crime were properly admitted as part of the res ges-
tae."49 Although under the particular facts of the instant case
(facts not set forth in the per curiam opinion) the statements
may have been clearly admissible, with deference it is submitted
that the language of the holdings is unduly broad. In the future,
45. See Comment, 14 LA. L. Rsv. 611 (1954) and The Work of the Louis4-
ana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term-Bv denoe, 31 LA. L. Rzv. 881,
385 (1971).
46. See Comment, 29 LA. L. Rv. 661 (1969).
47. Id.
48. 261 La. 35, 258 So.2d 863 (1972).
49. Id. at 39, 258 So.2d at 864.
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if applied literally, the language might well result in admitting
evidence that should not come in. Apparently defendant had
been arrested by the police officer by the time the alleged state-
ments were made. The mere fact that a statement is made by
a witness to an arresting officer at the scene of the crime should
not necessarily qualify the statement as part of the res gestae
and make it admissible. Nor, especially in light of Miranda v.
Arizona,50 should the fact that a defendant at the scene of a crime
remains silent, despite an accusation by the complaining witness,
in the presence of the arresting officer, necessarily mean that the
accusatory statement should come in. In any event it seems that
defendant's remaining silent is more pertinent to the admissibil-
ity of the evidence under the tacit admission rule than the res
gestae rule.1
Declaration Against Interest
In an action against one's own liability insurer to collect
under uninsured motorist coverage it is sometimes difficult to
establish that the other vehicle in the accident in fact was unin-
sured. In Campbell v. American Home Assurance Co.,2 the
supreme court appropriately held, in a decision authored by Jus-
tice Sanders, that a letter from the owner of the other vehicle,
a non-party to the litigation, who at the time of trial was in
England, stating that the vehicle was uninsured, was admissible
as a declaration against interest to prove the fact stated. The
court reasoned that an owner of a vehicle has personal knowl-
edge as to whether it is insured, and found that here the owner
(the writer of the letter) was unavailable as a witness since he
was in England at the time of trial. The letter was found to be
against the owner's interest, for under provisions of the Louisiana
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act the fact of non-insurance
at the time of accident requires the payment of damages, deposit
of security, or suspension of driver's license. 8
50. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
51. It is interesting to contrast the much stricter attitude toward res
gestae taken In a civil case by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal In TaZazao
v. Phoenix of Hartford Ins. Co., 259 So.2d 636 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972), rela-
tive to statements made (1) immediately after the accident, and (2) about
thirty to forty minutes after the accident, by one of the drivers Involved In
the accident as to his uninsured status.
52. 260 La. 1047, 258 So.2d 81 (1972). Bee also Talazac v. Phoenix of Hart-
ford Ins. Co., 259 So.2d 636 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972), another case decided in
the same term recognizing the difficulties Involved in such proof.
53. LA. R.S. 32:872 (1950), a8 amended by Acts 1962, No. 495, § 1.
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Declaration Against Penal Interest
Is a declaration against penal interest sufficient to meet the
"against interest" requirement for the declaration against inter-
est exception to the hearsay rule, or must the statement be a
declaration against the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary inter-
est? Justice Summers in his dissenting opinion in State v. Mor-
row54 took the position that penal interest should suffice, but the
majority, in a per curiam decision, deemed it unnecessary to
reach the point for they found that under the circumstances of
the instant case the declaration did not meet the unavailability
requirement for admissibility of a declaration against interest.
Business Records-Criminal Cases
In State v. Graves,55 a criminal case, the supreme court held
that a properly authenticated business record (a "firearms rec-
ord" kept by a merchant) was admissible by the state to show
that a pistol was sold to a cousin of the defendant. The entrant
of the business record was not present in court,56 but a witness
identified the handwriting as that of a former employee of the
store. Defendant thus had no opportunity to cross-examine the
entrant in order to ascertain why the entrant believed the vendee
of the pistol was the person named, the type of identifying docu-
ments (if any) supposedly supplied by the alleged purchaser, etc.
The propriety of recognizing a business records exception to
the hearsay rule in criminal cases, especially in circumstances
such as this, seems very questionable. The business records
exception is not expressly provided for by statute in criminal
cases in Louisiana; in fact a literal interpretation of the statutes
would appear to preclude its recognition. 57 Similarly, the pro-
54. 260 La. 72, 255 So.2d 78 (1971).
55. 259 La. 526, 250 So.2d 727 (1971).
56. It does not appear that there was any showing that the entrant was
unavailable as a witness. As to the necessity of showing unavailability in
connection with alleged violation of right of confrontation, see the discussion
in State v. Jones, 261 La. 422, 259 So.2d 899 (1972).
57. See LA. COD CRIM. P. art. 434: "Hearsay evidence is inadmissible,
except as otherwise provided in this code." In the opinion of the writer the
provisions of LA. CODE CraM. P. art. 460 relative to documentary evidence does
not create an exception to the hearsay rule, but merely provides how the
authenticity of a document is to be established when the document is admis-
sible as non-hearsay, or as an exception to the hearsay rule.
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priety of the business records exception in civil cases, and if so,
its appropriate ambit, is a matter of considerable doubt.58
It is a fundamental principle of Anglo-Saxon law that a
defendant should not be sent to prison on unsworn testimony,
and that he should have the right to full cross-examination of
all persons who give evidence against him. To the extent an out-
of-court statement is admissible on behalf of the state in a crim-
inal case as an exception to the hearsay rule, this principle is
abridged. Unquestionably, certain exceptions to the hearsay rule
are clearly desirable. Although some business records should be
admissible in criminal cases under narrow, restricted, well-
defined circumstances, the writer seriously doubts whether in
criminal cases Louisiana should embrace a broad regular course
of business exception. To do so might well violate defendant's
constitutional right of confrontation.59
Confessions-Advance Written Notice
Article 768 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that
if the state intends to introduce a confession or inculpatory
statement it shall so advise the defendant in writing prior to
the state's opening statement, and that if it fails to do so, the
confession or inculpatory statement is inadmissible in evidence.
The article makes no distinction between jury trials and bench
trials, nor does the code make any such distinction in the pre-
ceding articles relative to the opening statement requirement.0 0
Should article 768 nonetheless be read as requiring such advance
written notice in jury trials only? State v. Himel1 affords very
well-reasoned arguments on each side of the question. The
majority opinion, authored by Justice Barham, took the position
that the written notice is not required in a bench trial, relying
on the history and purpose of the opening statement and the
58. Although article 2248 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides that "the
books of merchants can not be given in evidence in their favor," the excep-
tion has, to a considerable extent, been recognized in civil cases. See Com-
ment, 21 LA. L. REv. 449 (1961).
59. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); State v. Tims, 9 Ohio St.
2d 136, 224 N.E.2d 348 (1967); and The Work of Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1970-1971 Term-Evidence, 32 LA. L. REV. 344, 351 (1972).
For a recent Louisiana case reversing a conviction because of what was
found to be a violation of right of confrontation, see State v. Washington,
261 La. 808, 261 So.2d 224 (1972) discussed at note 65 4nfra and accompanying
text.
60. LA. CoDE Camm. P. arts. 766 and 767.
61. 260 La. 949, 257 So.2d 670 (1972).
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written notice requirements. In so holding, the court recon-
sidered and reaffirmed its position in State v. Didiere2 that an
opening statement is not required in a misdemeanor bench trial.
Vigorous, forceful, and very persuasive dissents were written by
Justices Sanders and Summers.
In 1970 in State v. Lacoste,6 the Louisiana supreme court
held that under certain circumstances the failure to give the
required advance written notice might constitute harmless error.
The harmless error doctrine, held the court this term in State
v. Jackson," would not, however, avail the prosecution where
the state, before the trial commenced, knew of an incriminating
statement; and on a motion to suppress advised the defendant
that it would not utilize any such statement, but nevertheless
offered same on rebuttal after defendant had taken the stand.
Knowledge of the existence of an incriminating statement in the
hands of the prosecution is particularly important to the defense
in determining whether the defendant should take the stand. In
the opinion of the writer the court in Jackson was correct; use
of the statement on rebuttal was clearly harmful error.
CONsTrrI oNAL LIITATIONS ON ADMISSIBMITY-
RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION
In State v. Washington,5 the prosecution called an alleged
confederate of defendants to the stand and questioned him con-
cerning a confession he had allegedly given implicating the
defendants. The witness refused to answer, but by the questions
the state, over objection, brought to the attention of the jury
the contents of the confession. On cross-examination the witness
likewise refused to answer questions concerning the Co--esion.
Relying on Douglas v. Alabama,o the majority of the court,
speaking through Justice Summers, held that by this action
the prosecution violated defendants' right of confrontation.6
In the opinion of the writer the decision is correct. The con-
fession was inadmissible hearsay and to thus bring it to the
62. 259 La. 967, 254 So.2d 262 (1971).
63. 256 La. 697, 237 So.2d 871 (1970).
64. 260 La. 561, 256 So.2d 627 (1972).
65. 261 La. 808, 261 So.2d 224 (1972).
66. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
67. For additional discussion of the right of confrontation, see note 55
&upra and accompanying text.
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attention of the jury was a violation of defendants' constitu-
tional rights.P
Privilege Against Self-incrimination-The Miranda Caution
In State v. Graves6 9 defendant, after arrest, told the police
that he did not want to make a statement until he had conferred
again with his attorney. The majority of the court found that
he waived his rights when some three to five hours later, he
gave an exculpatory statement to the police.7 0 According to the
facts brought out by Justice Tate in his forceful dissent, the
defendant, following his arrest had been placed alone in a four
foot by four foot cell. When the police commenced questioning
the second time, defendant said he knew his rights, but did-not
expressly waive them. However, he gave an exculpatory state-
ment to the police as to his whereabouts. Using strong language,
Justice Tate deplored what he considered "the prosecution's
unnecessary insistence upon introducing in evidence a statement
of the accused taken in direct violation of Miranda v. Arizona."m
The writer agrees with Justice Tate that the introduction of the
statement under the circumstances violated the mandate of
Miranda that "[i]f the individual states that he wants an at-
torney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is pres-
entP"72
DiscovERy, INSPECTION, SUPPRESSION, ETC. im CRIMINAL CASES
Louisiana, it is said, was the first state in the Union to accord
the defendant in a criminal case the right to a pre-trial inspec-
tion of his written confession.78 It has been, however, extremely
68. The nature and importance of right of confrontation and its com-
panion, the right of cross-examination, were earlier set forth in another able
opinion on the subject authored by Justice Summers, State v. Giordano, 259
La. 155, 249 So.2d 558 (1971), which also reversed the conviction on this
ground.
69. 259 La. 526, 250 So.2d 727 (1971).
70. Unquestionably the defendant had been advised of his rights both by
his own attorney whom he had consulted prior to his arrest, and by the
police.
71. 259 La. at 542, 250 So.2d at 733 (1971).
72. 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966) (Emphasis added.)
73. State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 22 So.2d 273 (1945). See State v. Tune,
13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courtsfor the 1968-1969 Term-Evidence, 30 LA. L. REv. 321, 328 (1969) and The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1964-1965 Term-Evidence,
26 LA. L. REv. 606, 613 (1966).
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reluctant to extend the right,7 4 despite widespread statutory
and jurisprudential developments elsewhere in the country.75
Although quite limited In its scope, State v. Migliore" repre-
sents a breakthrough. A defendant charged with possession of
certain controlled dangerous substances (cocaine and LSD)
moved that an independent examination by an independent test-
ing laboratory be afforded him. Finding that there was sufficient
amount of the substance in question to permit such an examina-
tion, a divided court held that such a pre-trial inspection should
be permitted, subject to appropriate guidelines laid down by
the trial court. The court was careful to limit its holding as
much as possible, however, avoiding general pronouncements.
Nevertheless, the decision is of great significance, and in the
opinion of this writer is a favorable development very much in
the right direction.
Although recognizing the importance of Brady v. Maryland77
that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable
to an accused upon request violates due process where the evi-
dence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective
of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution," 8 the court in
State v. Bailey79 and State v. Gladden8 denied defendant any
right to embark upon a fishing expedition into the records of the
prosecution. A defendant may well find it difficult, therefore, to
vindicate his Brady rights.
Problems relative to discovery, inspection, production, and
suppression in criminal cases are all interrelated. The issues
involved are extremely sensitive in character, and ideally should
be approached on a trial and error, statutory or jurisprudential
basis, rather than on a more rigid constitutional plane. A com-
prehensive study, culminating in well thought out statutory pro-
posals, is much to, be desired.
74. It was extended to the right to inspect a video-taped confession in
State v. Hall, 253 La. 425, 218 So.2d 320 (1969).
75. See C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 97 (2d ed. 1972) and authorities cited
therein.
76. 261 La. 722, 260 So.2d 682 (1972).
77. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
78. 261 La. 831, 845, 261 So.2d 583, 588 (1972).
79. 261 La. 831, 261 So.2d 583 (1972).
80. 260 La. 735, 257 So.2d 388 (1972). see also State v. Davis, 259 La. 35,
249 So.2d 193 (1971).
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HARMLESS ERROR
The majority of the court in State v. Hills8' took the position
that even if certain evidence linking the defendant with other
crimes had been obtained in violation of defendant's right to be
free from unconstitutional search and seizure, the error was
"harmless." In so holding, the court appeared to rely upon the
federal harmless error rule, whereas it would seem to this
writer that Louisiana's rule would preclude holding an error of
such grave significance "harmless."' 2
Dissenting, Justices Tate and Barham argue most persuasive-
ly that the admissibility of the questioned evidence could not
properly be classified as harmless error. The interrelationship
between Louisiana's harmless error rule and the federal rule is
perceptively explored in a student comment in the preceding
issue of this Review.88
81. 259 La. 436, 250 So.2d 394 (1971).
82. See LA. CODE CraM. P. arts. 921 and 770. It appears to the writer that
such an error would, within the meaning of article 921, constitute "a sub-
stantial violation of a constitutional statutory right," and therefore com-
ments and questioning by a district attorney with respect to it would be
grounds for a mistrial within the meaning of article 770.
83. Comment, 33 LA. L. REv. 82 (1972). For a discussion as to whether
prosecutor's failure to give required pre-trial written notice of intention to
utilize a confession or inculpatory statement by the defendant constitutes
harmless error, see note 60 &upra and accompanying text. For another inter-
esting case dealing with harmless error, see State v. McClure, 258 La. 999,
249 So.2d 109 (1971).
